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ABSTRACT 
Departing from the Westphalian tradition, global administrative law is 
seen as arising from the pragmatic needs of transboundary regulation 
underpinned by a normative aspiration to rule of law beyond national 
boundaries.  Unhinged from state consent, however, it faces a twofold 
challenge: legality and legitimacy.  The former centers on the distinction 
between law and non-law; the latter is concerned with the legitimacy of 
global administrative law.  Benedict Kingsbury’s The Concept of ‘Law’ 
in Global Administrative Law attempts to answer this twofold challenge by 
centering the new paradigm of international law, as epitomized by global 
administrative law, on the notion of publicness.  First, he pins its solution 
on the substantive concept of publicness.  Second, he portrays global 
administrative law as an inter-public law, governing the relationship 
among regulatory regimes in accordance with the value of publicness.  
This Reply argues that Kingsbury’s publicness-centered conception of 
international law does not resolve the challenges facing global 
administrative law.  Rather, his version of global administrative law does 
not so much correspond to an inter-public law as points to a post-public 
conception of legitimacy, reflecting the trend of addressing the issue of 
fragmentation by tacitly adopting the strategy of privatization in global 
administrative law scholarship. 
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I. Introduction: The State and Challenges of Global Administrative 
Law 
Recent developments in international law are welcomed as indicating the end 
of the Hobbesian era of international relations and the beginning of the age of 
global rule of law.  Among these developments is the emerging global 
administrative law.  Departing from the Westphalian tradition, global 
administrative law is seen as arising from the pragmatic needs of transboundary 
regulation underpinned by a normative aspiration to a global rule of law.  
However, to break with the state consent-centered formalism in international law, a 
twofold challenge would emerge: legality and legitimacy. 1   The former is 
concerned with how to distinguish law from non-law; the latter with the 
democratic ground of global administrative law. 
The issues of legality and legitimacy are not new to international lawyers.  
For one thing, beyond the peremptory norms codified in treaties and decided by 
international tribunals, the question of what constitutes jus cogens was never 
settled.  Whether state consent provides the sufficient condition for the legitimacy 
of international legal system remains a subject of contestation.  Nevertheless, 
state consent provides the common ground for scholars of different persuasions to 
settle on concerning what is necessary for the legitimacy of international law.  
Moreover, with the translation of the issue of legality concerning jus cogens into 
one of legal and constitutional interpretation, the incorporation of jus cogens into 
national legal systems is decided in light of national constitutions, which are 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Krisch and Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative 
Law in the International Legal Order’, 17 EJIL (2006) 1, at 10. 
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considered the ultimate expression of the national will.  Accordingly, the final 
solution to the questions of legality and legitimacy facing traditional international 
law rests on state consent.  
From the perspective of the current practice in international law, particularly 
global administrative law, however, state consent is not the solution to, but instead 
the problem of, the world order.  Grounded by state consent, traditional 
international law fell prey to state sovereignty.  Against this backdrop, global 
administrative law is conceived of as unhinged from state consent.2  Nevertheless, 
that global administrative law, as the paradigm case of contemporary international 
law, departs from state consent unsettles the aforementioned voluntarist view of 
the international legal order.  Without the formal foundation of legitimacy rooted 
in state consent, where does global administrative law ground its legitimacy?  
Moreover, distanced from sovereign states, the legality of global administrative 
law becomes obscure.  This is why current international law in general, and 
global administrative law in particular, fall under the spell of legitimacy deficit and 
are haunted by the question of how to distinguish law from non-law. 
Benedict Kingsbury’s The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law3 
attempts to answer this twofold challenge – legality and legitimacy – by centering 
the new paradigm of international law, as epitomized by global administrative law, 
on the notion of publicness.  This article argues that Kingsbury’s 
publicness-centered conception of international law does not resolve the challenges 
facing global administrative law.  Rather, his version of global administrative law 
does not so much correspond to an inter-public law as he asserts as point to a 
post-public conception of legitimacy, reflecting the trend of addressing the issue of 
fragmentation by tacitly adopting the strategy of privatization in global 
administrative law scholarship. 
II. Kingsbury’s Publicness Solution to Overlayering Publics:    
Hart Read through Fuller’s Lens 
While Kingsbury adds the normative element of publicness to his proposed 
conception of law in global administrative law, he stresses that this conception of 
law is rooted in H.L.A. Hart’s ‘positivist jurisprudential approach in The Concept 
of Law’.4  On the one hand, Kingsbury questions whether any approach to law 
other than legal positivism can provide a baseline acceptability for determining 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
3 Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law, 20 EJIL (2009) 23. 
4 Ibid., at 29. 
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what is law given the absence of agreement on content-based criteria and of an 
agreed political theory.5  On the other hand, abandoning content-based legal 
theories, he turns to a particular strand of legal positivism: Hart’s social fact 
conception of law.  Unlike command theories, the characteristic of which is the 
notion of the state’s determinate sovereign command as the foundation of law, 
Hart’s positivist conception of law is centered on non-volitional social facts.6  In 
terms of global administrative law’s departure from state-based conceptions of 
law, Kingsbury argues that Hart’s social fact conception of law better accounts for 
the current situation of global administrative law. 
Building on Hart’s non-volitional positivist theory, Kingsbury’s conception 
of law goes beyond Hart’s strict separation of the rule of recognition from 
normative judgment.  Through a double theoretical innovative move, by way of 
which Hart’s social fact conception of law is read through Lon Fuller’s notion of 
the ‘inner morality of law’, Kingsbury aims to answer the twofold challenge – 
legality and legitimacy – facing global administrative law.  Kingsbury’s 
theoretical innovation pivots on his extension of the rule of recognition at the heart 
of Hart’s legal theory to include the notion of publicness.  At the core of 
publicness are ‘the claim made for law that it has been wrought by the whole 
society, by the public, and the connected claim that law addresses matters of 
concern to the society as such’.7  Thus, a law that answers to publicness rests on a 
more solid normative ground than a pure Hartian conception of law,8 which is 
ultimately determined by social facts independent of normative judgment.   
However, to avoid the challenges facing content-based conceptions of law in 
the absence of agreement on moral values, Kingsbury embeds the substantive 
notion of publicness in the practices of law.9  Instead of situating it in the 
normative judgment external to the fact of legal practices, he locates publicness in 
the operation of the legal system itself.  Given that current transnational 
regulatory regimes are oriented towards values that he clusters around the notion of 
publicness, Kingsbury construes the practices in today’s global regulatory regimes 
as indicating the ‘fit’ between Hart’s social fact conception of law and the reality 
of global administrative law.  Publicness is understood as ‘what is intrinsic to 
public law as generally understood’.10  Notably, on this view, publicness is rooted 
in, not imposed on, the various ‘publics’ that produce the nascent global 
administrative law through regulatory practices.  Moreover, the attributes, 
                                                
5 Ibid., at 28. 
6 Ibid., at 27-28. 
7 Ibid., at 31. 
8 Ibid., at 31-32. 
9 Ibid., at 30-31. 
10 Ibid., at 30. 
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constraints, and normative commitments, which Kingsbury associates with 
publicness, are ‘immanent in public law’.11  Adding the normative notion of 
publicness to the components of the Hartian rule of recognition concerning global 
administrative law, Kingsbury’s approach amounts to reconstructing Hart’s 
positivism in light of Fuller’s concept of ‘inner morality of law’.12 
By way of this first theoretical innovation, Kingsbury not only resolves the 
question of legality concerning global administrative law but also suggests an 
alternative notion of legitimacy.  Through the lens of publicness, variegated 
practices of decentered transboundary regulatory regimes can be further divided 
into those that correspond to publicness and those that do not, resolving the issue 
of what is law in the debate over global administrative law.  At the same time, 
Kingsbury’s revisionist social fact conception of law lays the normative ground for 
global administrative law without being dragged into the debate over moral 
disagreement.  In this way, Kingsbury’s approach provides an alternative baseline 
concept of legitimacy, answering the legitimacy challenge that results from the 
separation of global administrative law from state consent.13   
Nevertheless, Kingsbury’s theory up to this point has not fully addressed the 
challenges that legality and legitimacy pose to global administrative law.  In 
contrast to the sovereign state as the traditional administrative space where 
national administrative law operates, Kingsbury argues, global administrative 
space is decentered.  Correspondingly, his social fact conception of global 
administrative law emerges from the practices in heterogeneous transboundary 
regulatory regimes.  Moreover, as Kingsbury notes, although the values and 
norms clustered around the notion of publicness are widely accepted, how the 
notion of publicness should be carried out in practice turns on the functioning of 
regulatory regimes.  The public of each regulatory regime is made up of 
regulators, regulatees, as well as third parties without direct interests.  To make 
the claim for a law that ‘it has been wrought by the whole society, by the public’ 
and ‘addresses matters of concern to the society as such’ the carrying out of the 
notion of publicness cannot be dictated by regulators.  Rather, it must result from 
the values that the members, or rather, interested parties, of a particular regulatory 
regime, i.e., the regulatory public, hold in common.  In other words, publicness is 
associated with the public to which a particular regulatory regime relates.14  In the 
absence of a global public, however, the publics are decentered and indefinite, 
making global administrative law unintelligible.  Thus, in the face of the 
overlayering publics in global administrative space, how to draw the jurisdictional 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., at 38-40. 
13 Ibid., at 39-40. 
14 Ibid., at 56. 
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boundaries between regulatory regimes so as to spell out the specifics of the 
concept of publicness in diverse regulatory practices poses another fundamental 
challenge to global administrative law. 
Here comes in Kingsbury’s second theoretical move.  Although he pins the 
solution to theoretical issues of legality and legitimacy on the substantive concept 
of publicness, Kingsbury gives a formalist answer to the issue of boundary 
drawing regarding regulatory publics, the incubators of publicness, in global 
administrative law.  The focus of Kingsbury’s conception of global administrative 
law is not on the publics where the notion of publicness is substantiated but instead 
switches to the entities that exercise regulatory powers. 15  Thus, Kingsbury 
escapes from the difficulty of specifically identifying and delineating individual 
regulatory publics in this overlayered global administrative space.  The issue of 
jurisdictional distinction concerning global administrative law is recast as one of 
legal technicality, which is resolved with the traditional conflicts of laws skills.  
On this view, jurisdictions in global administrative law are the state and non-state 
entities that exercise public authorities and regulatory powers in global regulatory 
practices.  Their interrelationships are treated as conflicts of laws arrangements.16 
III. From Fragmentation to Privatization: Putting Kingsbury’s 
Inter-Public Law in Its Place 
Emerging from Kingsbury’s double theoretical move is a vision of global 
administrative law that plays a dual role.  First, it functions on the level of 
individual regulatory regimes.  In this regard, global administrative law is not as 
global as denoted.  Rather, it refers to the widespread phenomenon that diverse 
regulatory practices in the decentered global administrative space converge on the 
normative concept of publicness.17  In addition, global administrative law plays a 
more integrating role on a general level.  As noted above, one central challenge to 
embedding global administrative law in the decentered global administrative space 
is the (un)intelligibility of how to delineate and relate different regulatory regimes.  
In response, Kingsbury takes a formalist view and resorts to conflict of laws skills.  
Component units of global administrative space, which consists of overlayering 
regulatory publics, are identified with the entities that exercise public regulatory 
authorities and their relationships are governed by conflicts of law doctrines.18  
Thus, what governs the relationship among regulatory regimes is crucial to a 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., at 34-50. 
18 Ibid., at 56. 
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well-ordered global administrative space.  Kingsbury assigns this role to global 
administrative law.  Paralleling its ‘special part’ that governs the practices of 
individual regulatory regimes, Kingsbury argues, global administrative law 
functions as an ‘inter-public law’.19  On this general level, global administrative 
law governs the relationship among the power-exercising entities according to the 
values of publicness. 
To do justice to Kingsbury’s theoretical initiative, his innovative proposal 
needs to be situated in the post-Westphalian international order.  What looms 
large in this changing legal order is the question of fragmentation following the 
declining role of nation-states in the international system.20  Public authorities do 
not diminish as states are displaced from the center of the international legal order.  
Rather, the exercise of public authorities is decentered and thus fragmented.  Yet, 
regime collision as the result of the fragmentation of global regulatory power 
overshadows the post-Westphalian cosmopolitan aspiration.  Against this 
backdrop, Kingsbury asserts that his conception of global administrative law as an 
inter-public law provides the best possible answer to the fragmented global 
administrative space: ‘pluralism in unity’.21  Regime collision is accordingly 
understood as an issue of inter-public legality, which is concerned with the 
identification and choice of the applicable law regarding regulatory regimes.  In 
other words, regime collision results from interpretation errors.  Kingsbury’s 
conception of global administrative law rests on the interpretation of law and the 
correct application of conflict of laws doctrines.  However, a closer look at how 
the notion of publicness figures in Kingsbury’s social fact conception of law 
reveals that the idea of inter-public legality at the heart of Kingsbury’s global 
administrative law suggests a radical attitude toward legitimacy: a post-public 
conception of legitimacy. 
As Kingsbury notes, a necessary condition for the global regulatory practices 
to be taken as global administrative law is ‘a sense that they are…obligatory’.22  
This sense of obligation must be shared for the notion of publicness underlying 
Kingsbury’s social fact conception of law to be viewed as ‘immanent’.  
Moreover, such a shared sense of obligation does not form outside a 
jurisgenerative community.  As part of legal nomos, it takes roots in the 
socio-historical narratives, the foundation of a public in which the law originates.23 
                                                
19 Ibid., at 55. 
20 Kingsbury, ‘International Law as Inter-Public Law’, in H. Richardson and M. Williams 
(eds.), Moral Universalism and Pluralism (2009)167, at 171. 
21 Ibid., 197. 
22 Kingsbury, supra note 3, at 30. 
23 See generally Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’, 97 
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In contrast, the architecture of Kingsbury’s global administrative law is 
constructed around the power-exercising public entities instead of the 
heterogeneous jurisgenerative publics.  To deflect the challenge from drawing 
boundaries among the regulatory publics, Kingsbury focuses his attention on the 
notion of publicness, which he ties to the power-exercising public entities, in 
conceiving of global administrative law as an inter-public law.  Nevertheless, 
contrary to Kingsbury’s contention, this public- independent notion of publicness 
is not intrinsic to a jurisgenerative view of global administrative law.  Consider 
the reality of global regulatory regimes.  First, the creation and organization of 
power-exercising entities are subject only to a flimsy form of democratic control 
through treaty ratification.  Second, while the operation of these public entities is 
seen as moving toward publicness, their regulatory decisions remain on the 
margins of public contestation.  Outside the state arenas, only those with 
privileged sources of intelligence concerning global administrative law are able to 
play the role of informed and active citizens in its generation.  As a result, leaving 
the jurisgenerative role of the publics unaddressed and centering the carrying out 
of publicness on the public entities, Kingsbury’s conception of global 
administrative law is jurispathic.24 
For this reason, Kingsbury’s jurispathic conception of global administrative 
law appears to be faced with a fundamental legitimacy crisis, despite his claim to 
resolve the issues of legality and legitimacy by resorting to the idea of inter-public 
legality.  Legal nomos uprooted from socio-historical narratives is empty and its 
legitimacy is thus called into question.  However, when the focus switches from 
the ‘special part’ of global administrative law to its role at the general level, what 
would emerge from Kingsbury’s jusrispathic conception of global administrative 
law suggests the notion of post-public legitimacy in the place of legitimacy crisis. 
As indicated above, Kingsbury envisions global administrative law on the 
general level as the inter-public law governing the relationships among regulatory 
regimes.  Given the absence of generally applicable regulatory practices,25 a 
global notion of publicness that sustains a global administrative law is elusive.  
Thus, global administrative law as an inter-public law appears to rely on normative 
values that are global in application but not immanent in current global regulatory 
practices, suggesting a cosmopolitan view of a global legal order.  However, 
Kingsbury explicitly rejects cosmopolitanism as a feasible approach to the new 
international legal order. 26   Instead, he turns to a political view of global 
administrative law. 
                                                                                                                       
Harvard Law Review (1983) 4. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Kingsbury, supra note 3, at 51-52. 
26 Kingsbury, supra note 20, at 173. 
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In putting forward his proposal, Kingsbury notes that theoretical architecture 
cannot be built without assuming a political position.27  Assuming a political view 
of theory building, he argues that the binary ‘validity/invalidity’ question should be 
replaced with an assessment of ‘weight’ as the central issue in global 
administrative law.28  Instead of asking whether a particular norm emerging from 
regulatory practices is a valid legal rule, Kingsbury is concerned about how much 
weight a power-exercising public entity should give to a norm set by another 
entity.  In other words, at the core of global administrative law as an inter-public 
law is a ‘weighing’ of the norms emerging from the practices of different 
power-exercising public entities. 
Taken together, Kingsbury’s conception of global administrative law aims to 
provide a general legal framework within which the fragmented global 
administrative space can be conceived as well-ordered.  Aware of the legitimacy 
challenge facing this general global law, however, Kingsbury turns to a political 
view of law and locates its legitimacy outside of democratic control.  
Accordingly, Kingsbury unties his global administrative law as an inter-public law 
from jurisgenerative publics.  The notion of publicness is thus not expressive of a 
public conception of legitimacy but rather collapses into the codes of conduct 
observed by privileged interested parties in individual regulatory regimes.  To the 
extent that Kingsbury attributes publicness, the cornerstone of his theory 
concerning legitimacy, to the diverse practices in regulatory regimes, his 
conception of global administrative law reflects a privatized, post-public view of 
legitimacy.  Paralleling this privatized, post-public legitimacy on its ‘special part’ 
global administrative law as an inter-public law is centered on negotiations over 
the weight of these diverse practices concerning publicness.29  Again, these 
negotiations depend on those informed but privileged global actors’ views toward 
individual regulatory regimes.  In sum, Kingsbury’s grounding global 
administrative law in the idea of inter-public legality boils down to making an end 
run around democracy, pointing to a post-public legitimacy.  
IV. Conclusion 
This article has pointed out that Kingsbury’s conception of global 
administrative law as an inter-public law is formed against the backdrop of the 
fragmentation of the international order.  Facing the plurality of legal orders and 
the absence of a global public, attempts to revitalize the legitimacy of the global 
                                                
27 Kingsbury, supra note 3, at 26. 
28 Ibid., at 27. 
29 Ibid., at 55. 
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legal order in a jurisgenerative public seem to lead nowhere.  Privatization of 
legitimacy is thus emerging as the popular strategy in response.30  In the last 
analysis, Kingsbury’s concept of global administrative law as an inter-public law 
reflects a political strategy to substitute a post-public legitimacy for 
democracy-oriented conceptions of legitimacy.  Thus, Kingsbury’s approach 
corresponds to the trend of addressing the issue of fragmentation by tacitly 
adopting the strategy of privatization in conceiving contemporary international 
legal order.  It remains to be seen whether this privatization turn would stand as a 
new paradigm for international law.   
                                                
30 Ibid., at 52-53. 
